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This Article will focus on the question of exclusive competence in the field of EU external
relations, especially in the light of recent developments. After a brief discussion on the origins and
development of exclusive competence, a distinction will be made between common commercial
policy, which has traditionally been the most important area of an explicit “a priori” exclusive
competence, and what is often called an implicit exclusive competence, which, as it is today based
on some general criteria enshrined in TFEU Article 3(2), may be called “supervening” exclusive
competence. With regard to both categories, the main focus will be on recent developments,
notably the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced the TFEU and its Articles 2 and 3, as
well as the case law of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”) following the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on December 1, 2009.
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the features which distinguishes the European Union 
from intergovernmental organizations is the fact that the European 
Union, in some areas, has so-called exclusive competence, excluding 
a parallel competence for its Member States.1 According to Article 
2(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”),2 “[w]hen the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive 
competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so 
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the 
implementation of Union acts.”  
As can be seen from TFEU Article 3, the exclusive competence 
also exists with regard to EU external relations, that is, the treaty and 
other relations of the European Union with third states. Article 3(1) 
                                                            
* Judge at the European Court of Justice. Dr.Jur., Dr.Jur. h.c., Dr.Pol.Sc. h.c. Senior 
Fellow of the University of Turku, Visiting Professor, College of Europe and University of 
Helsinki.  
1. On the differences in competence and powers between the EU and intergovernmental 
organizations in general, see ALLAN ROSAS & LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
AN INTRODUCTION 15-17 (2d rev. ed. 2012). 
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 2, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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provides for “a priori exclusivity”3 in the following areas: (a) customs 
union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the 
Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of 
marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; and 
(e) common commercial policy. Points (d) and (e) especially are 
highly relevant in the context of EU external relations. Article 3(2), 
for its part, adds to the categories of exclusive external competence 
three general criteria for determining whether the conclusion of an 
international agreement falls under an exclusive competence even if 
the agreement does not belong to any of the categories enumerated in 
Article 3(1). 
The question of exclusive competence should be seen in the 
broader context of the competence and powers of the European Union 
in external relations and its treaty relations with third states in 
particular. If an EU competence is not exclusive, it is in most cases 
shared with the Member States.4 Agreements concluded under a 
shared competence usually become mixed, which means that they will 
be open for conclusion by not only the European Union but also its 
Member States. In addition, EU Member States continue to conclude 
international agreements in their own names, without the participation 
of the European Union as a contracting party, including sometimes on 
matters which belong to an EU exclusive or shared competence.  
One should thus distinguish between the following three 
categories of international agreements: (1) agreements concluded by 
the European Union alone; (2) agreements concluded by the European 
Union and one or more of its Member States (mixed agreements); and 
(3) agreements concluded by one or more Member States. 
Agreements concluded by the EU, including mixed agreements, are 
binding upon both the EU institutions and the Member States.5 Whilst 
the agreements concluded by Member States without formal EU 
participation are, in principle, part of the national law of the Member 
States that have concluded them and are not part of EU law, such 
agreements may become relevant for EU law purposes as well, 
                                                            
3. Alan Dashwood, Mixity in the Era of the Treaty of Lisbon, in MIXED AGREEMENTS 
REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 351, 356 (Christophe Hillion & 
Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010).  
4. See, e.g., Dashwood, supra note 3. 
5. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 216(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 144.  
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especially if the agreement in question concerns matters falling under 
an EU competence.6 
The practical importance of the distinction between exclusive 
and shared competence should not be exaggerated.7 Even in an area of 
exclusive competence, the European Union may be barred from 
becoming a party to an international convention or member of an 
international organization by an adherence clause that is limited to 
Member States. In such situations and some others, the European 
Union may have to authorize the Member States to act in the interest 
of the Union. In areas of shared competence, again, the so-called duty 
of cooperation may require that the EU institutions and the Member 
States act jointly, and may in some instances prevent the Member 
States from acting alone.8  
Yet, the question of whether the European Union can act alone, 
notably in concluding international agreements, or whether Member 
States’ participation is allowed or called for, does have significance 
both in theory and in practice—not only for the relations between the 
European Union and its Member States, but also for its relations with 
third states. The latter will normally prefer EU agreements to mixed 
agreements, wishing to avoid the complexities and uncertainties 
stemming from mixed agreements—who, on the EU side, is 
responsible for what?9 
This Article will focus on the question of exclusive competence 
in the field of EU external relations, especially in the light of recent 
developments. After a brief discussion on the origins and 
development of exclusive competence, a distinction will be made 
between common commercial policy, which has traditionally been the 
most important area of an explicit “a priori” exclusive competence, 
and what is often called an implicit exclusive competence, which, as 
it is today based on some general criteria enshrined in TFEU Article 
3(2), may be called “supervening” exclusive competence.10 With 
regard to both categories, the main focus will be on recent 
                                                            
6. Allan Rosas, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU 
Member States, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1304, 1310 (2011).  
7. See Allan Rosas, Exclusive, Shared and National Competence in the Context of EU 
External Relations: Do Such Distinctions Matter?, in  THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARC MARESCEAU 17 (Inge Govaere et al. eds., 2013).  
8. See Commission v. Sweden, Case C-246/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-03317.  
9. See Peter Olson, Mixity from the Outside: The Perspective of a Treaty Partner, in 
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 3, at 331.  
10. See Dashwood, supra note 3, at 360. 
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developments, notably the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon,11 which 
introduced the TFEU and its Articles 2 and 3, as well as the case law 
of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”)12 following 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on December 1, 2009. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The idea that the European Union may in certain areas of 
external relations have an exclusive competence is no novelty. As the 
aims of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community included the creation of a customs union as well as an 
internal market, it became almost inevitable to provide for a common 
commercial policy as well. What are today TFEU Articles 206–207 
on common commercial policy were included already in a different 
form in Articles 110–116 of the original Treaty of Rome. A common 
customs tariff was established during the 1960s while some import 
restrictions maintained by individual Member States were abolished 
only much later.13 
In an Opinion of 1975, the ECJ for the first time explicitly 
confirmed that the common commercial policy belonged to the area 
of exclusive competence.14 After having considered that export credits 
are covered by the notion of export policy and more generally by the 
common commercial policy, the Court held that in the field of export 
credits, accepting a concurrent competence of the Member States 
would distort competition between undertakings of the various 
Member States and would, inter alia, prevent the Community “from 
fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest.”15 In 
subsequent case law, the Court, as far as the trade in goods is 
concerned, confirmed its fairly broad understanding of the concept of 
common commercial policy, including various sorts of restrictions or 
                                                            
11. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter 
Treaty of Lisbon]. 
12. The Court of Justice of the European Union, according to Article 19 of the Treaty on 
European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter “TEU”], includes the Court of Justice, the 
General Court, and specialized courts.  
13. PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 11-13 (2d ed. 2011). On the 
origins of the notion of common commercial policy as an exclusive competence, see MOSHE 
KANIEL, THE EXCLUSIVE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY UP TO 
THE PERIOD OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 17-19, 67-79 (1996). 
14. Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, [1975] E.C.R. 1355.  
15. Id. at 1364. 
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regulations such as technical, sanitary and other barriers to trade, 
export credits, and tariff preferences in favor of developing 
countries.16 The question as to whether also to include the trade in 
services and the trade aspects of intellectual property rights, as well as 
the question of the borderline between trade in goods and measures 
affecting trade but having non-trade objectives, will be considered 
below.  
Whilst the common commercial policy has from the beginning 
been based on an explicit Treaty provision—although the exclusive 
nature of that competence was, perhaps, not crystal clear before 
Opinion 1/75—the ECJ already was faced in 1971 with the question 
as to whether the Community’s external competence could also be 
founded on considerations other than an explicit Treaty provision to 
that effect. In what has become known as the AETR/ERTA judgment 
(after the European Agreement Concerning the Work of Crews of 
Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport), the Court held 
that a competence to conclude international agreements may not only 
arise from an explicit provision to that effect in the Treaties but may 
“equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures 
adopted . . . by the Community institutions.”17 This assertion of 
competence was immediately followed by an assertion of exclusive 
competence, sometimes referred to as an “implicit” exclusive 
competence. The Court famously held that each time the Community, 
with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the 
Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, “the Member 
States no longer have the right, acting individually or even 
collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect 
those rules.”18  
The AETR/ERTA approach was supplemented in 1976 by 
another principle formulating an implied competence in the external 
field. In Opinion 1/76 the ECJ held that there may be a Community 
competence to conclude an international agreement even if an internal 
competence had not yet been exercised and thus no Community 
                                                            
16. See, e.g., Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 
EU:C:1979:224 (which concluded, on the other hand, that Member States’ participation in a 
financing scheme would imply a mixed agreement); Case C-45/86, Comm’n v. Council, 1987 
EU:C:1987:163; Case C-62/88, Greece v. Council (“Chernobyl”), 1990 EU:C:1990:153; see 
also EECKHOUT, supra note 13, 18-25. 
17. Case C-22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 EU:C:1971:32, ¶ 16; see also, e.g., 
EECKHOUT, supra note 13, 71-82. 
18. Comm’n v. Council, ¶ 17. 
1078 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1073 
legislation adopted, namely if that was “necessary” for the attainment 
of a specific Treaty objective and that objective could not be attained 
by adopting internal measures.19 There has been disagreement as to 
whether the Court by this so-called 1/76 dictum intended to assert an 
exclusive competence, or whether it was merely a confirmation of the 
fact that in some instances, the Community could exercise an external 
competence even if the substantive competence had not yet been 
exercised internally.20 Today the 1/76 dictum is expressed in TFEU 
Article 3(2) and it is thus beyond doubt that it may constitute a 
ground for an exclusive competence. Its precise scope and content 
remain to be clarified by the ECJ or otherwise. 
As to the common fishery policy, the ECJ in 1976 held that as a 
combined effect of Treaty provisions on the common agricultural 
policy, regulations adopted by the Council, and a provision of the Act 
of Accession of 1973—when Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom acceded to the Communities—the Community had acquired 
a competence to enter into international commitments for the 
conservation of the resources of the sea.21 As the provision of the Act 
of Accession, according to which the Council had an obligation to 
determine conditions for fishing, with the view to ensuring protection 
of fishing grounds and conservation of the biological resources of the 
sea, became applicable on January 1, 1979, the Court in a case 
decided in 1981 held that the Member States were “no longer entitled 
to exercise any power of their own in the matter of conservation 
measures in the waters under their jurisdiction”22 and that the 
competence has thus become “exclusive.”23 This development may be 
seen as a combination of the explicit Treaty-based competence 
approach and the “implicit” competence introduced by the 
AETR/ERTA judgment.   
In the following, I shall focus on the subsequent developments 
first, of the common commercial policy, and then, of the AETR/ERTA 
                                                            
19. Opinion 1/76, European Lay-Up Fund for Inland Waterways Vessels, 1977 
EU:C:1977:63, ¶¶ 2-5. 
20. See, e.g., Piet Eeckhout, Exclusive External Competences: Constructing the EU as 
an International Actor, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-
LAW, 611 at 628-30 (2012); EECKHOUT, supra note 13, at 76-82. 
21. Kramer and Others, Joined Cases 3, 4, & 6/76, EU:C:1976:114, ¶ 33; see also Case 
C-32/79, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 1980 EU:C:1980:189. 
22. Case C-804/79, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 1981 EU:C:1981:93, ¶ 18. 
23. Id. ¶ 27. 
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principle, while leaving aside other situations or contexts where an 
exclusive competence could arise, such as the “necessity” criterion 
first launched in Opinion 1/76, the common fisheries policy, or some 
other grounds for an exclusive competence now recognized in TFEU 
Article 3(1)—for instance, monetary policy. The common 
commercial policy and the AETR/ERTA principle have been chosen 
because it is in these two contexts that recent developments in Treaty 
law and case law have brought new elements to the debate about 
exclusive external competence.  
II. COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY 
As explained above, the ECJ already at an early stage adopted a 
fairly broad understanding of what constitutes trade in goods and thus 
falls under the common commercial policy. In Opinion 1/94,24 the 
Court confirmed that not only the General Agreement on Tarriffs and 
Trade (“GATT”), but also all the multilateral agreements on trade in 
goods provided for in Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) of 1994,25 fall 
under the common commercial policy and thus belong to the sphere 
of exclusive competence. There also appeared indications in the 
Court’s case law that measures regulating international trade may 
belong to the sphere of exclusive competence even if they pursue 
other ultimate objectives (development, environment, political 
objectives, and so on).26 On the other hand, some later decisions are 
based on the idea that measures affecting trade may escape the realm 
of common commercial policy if the predominant objectives and 
components of the agreement are to be seen elsewhere, notably in the 
protection of the environment.27 
                                                            
24. Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement, 1994 EU:C:1994:384.  
25. 1994 O.J. L 336/3. 
26. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, Les relations internationales commerciales de l’Union 
européenne – Un aperçu juridique et développements actuels, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT 
BROMS: CELEBRATING HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY 16 OCTOBER 1999 428, 430-433 (Finnish Branch 
of the Int’l L. Ass’n, 1999). 
27. See, e.g., Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, [2001] E.C.R. I-9713, ¶ 40; Case C-
94/03, Comm'n v. Council, [1996] E.C.R. I-01; Case C-411/06, Comm'n v. Parliament and 
Council, [2009] E.C.R. I-7585, ¶ 71; cf. Comm’n v. Council (“Energy Star”), [2002] E.C.R. I-
12049 (where the Court held the commercial policy objective was predominant and that the 
agreement in question fell under an exclusive competence); see also EECKHOUT, supra note 
13, at 39-57. 
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As to trade in services services and the trade aspects of 
intellectual property rights, the ECJ, in Opinion 1/94, famously ruled 
that matters dealt with in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (“GATS”)28 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)29 fell, as a general rule, 
outside the realm of common commercial policy and thus exclusive 
competence. While after this Opinion a pragmatic way of dealing 
with WTO matters was found, giving the Commission the task of 
representing the Community and its Member States also in GATS and 
TRIPS contexts—albeit based on previous coordination between the 
Commission and the Member States,30 the formal distinction between 
exclusive (GATT) and shared competence (GATS and TRIPS) 
continued to be a source of uncertainty and concern,31 and various 
initiatives were taken to bring the latter under the umbrella of 
common commercial policy. 
One such effort was made in the context of the Treaty of Nice of 
2001, which amended, inter alia, the EC Treaty, including its then 
Article 133 relating to common commercial policy. Whilst Article 
133(5), as amended, provided that the conclusion of international 
agreements in the fields of trade in services and the trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights fell under paragraphs one to 
four of the same Article, in other words under the common 
commercial policy—and thus an exclusive competence, this was said 
to be “without prejudice” to paragraph six. And Article 133(6) stated 
that trade in certain sensitive service sectors (cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services, and social and human health services) 
continued to fall under a shared competence and required joint 
conclusion by the Community and its Member States and added that 
                                                            
28. 1994 O.J. (L 336) 190; see Case C-360/93, Parliament v. Council, [1996], E.C.R. I-
11954, where the Court, by referring to Opinion 1/94, observed that only services which are 
supplied across frontiers fall within the scope of the common commercial policy (¶ 29) and 
annulled the decision to conclude an agreement on public procurement as it had been based on 
Article 113 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU Article 207) alone. 
29. 1994 O.J. (L 336) 213.  
30. See, e.g., Joni Heliskoski, Joint Competence of the European Community and its 
Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization, 2 
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. 61 (1999). 
31. As TRIPS was considered to fall under a shared competence, the ECJ was in many 
cases confronted with the question of the division of competence between the Community and 
the Member States in order to ascertain which parts of the Agreement formed part of 
Community law. See, e.g., Case C-431/05, Merck Genéricos - Produtos Farmacêuticos Lda v. 
Merck & Co. Inc., [2007] E.C.R. I-7001.  
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transport agreements continued to fall under some other parts of the 
Treaty—not providing for any explicit exclusive competence.  
In Opinion 1/08, given the day before the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, containing yet another version of Article 133 (now 
TFEU Article 207), the ECJ refuted the thesis of the Commission and 
the European Parliament according to which the exception contained 
in Article 133(6) only concerned agreements which exclusively or 
predominantly covered the services belonging to the sensitive sectors 
listed in Article 133(6). The Court also confirmed that the transport 
aspects of such an agreement were not covered by Article 133 at all.32 
The conclusion of the agreements made in the context of GATS thus 
fell within the sphere of shared competence of the Community and its 
Member States. 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty changed the legal 
landscape in a significant manner. The former Article 133 of the EC 
Treaty became TFEU Article 207, and its first paragraph now lists 
measures relating not only to trade in goods but also to trade in 
services as well as the commercial aspects of intellectual property. 
What is more, “foreign direct investment” is mentioned as well. It 
thus became clear that these areas are included in the concept of 
common commercial policy and thus are covered by TFEU Article 
3(1)(e), providing for an exclusive competence in the area of 
“common commercial policy.” 
That this new provision did not settle all possible disagreements 
to which the question of the exact scope of the common commercial 
policy could give rise became clear in the context of a request for a 
preliminary ruling submitted to the ECJ in 2011. The national (Greek) 
judge wanted to know whether a provision of TRIPS (Article 27) 
setting out the framework for patent protection fell within an area for 
which the Member States continued to have primary competence—in 
which case they would have been free to decide on the possible direct 
effect of the provision in question—and also put some questions 
relating to the interpretation of this and another provision of TRIPS.33 
The Court answered the first question in the negative, concluding that 
                                                            
32. Opinion 1/08, 2009 E.C.R.  I-11129, concerned the conclusion of agreements on the 
grant of compensation for modification and withdrawal of certain GATS commitments 
following the accession of new Member States to the EU. 
33. Case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo v. DEMO, [2013] E.C.R. I-___ (delivered July 18, 
2013), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=139744
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=821637.  
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TRIPS Article 27 “falls within the field of the common commercial 
policy.”  
This conclusion must be seen in the context of the arguments put 
before the Court by a number of Member States. They argued that the 
question should be approached in the context of the case law of the 
Court relating to mixed agreements, implying that there was an EU 
competence only to the extent that the European Union had exercised 
its powers and adopted provisions to implement the agreement. This 
was because the majority of the rules of TRIPS, such as those 
concerning patentability, should be considered as concerning 
international trade only indirectly, and hence as falling outside the 
field of common commercial policy. The Court disagreed, observing, 
inter alia, that TFEU Article 207 differed noticeably from Article 133 
of the EC Treaty, that Opinions 1/94 and 1/08 were no longer 
relevant, that TRIPS, being as it is an integral part of the WTO 
system,34 has a specific link with international trade, and also that the 
terms used in TFEU Article 207(1) “correspond almost literally” to 
the very title of TRIPS.35 
Whilst this judgment should by now have settled the question of 
the status of TRIPS, there may be other issues to clarify in the future 
concerning the precise scope of TFEU Article 270(1), such as the 
question of other international agreements relating to the protection of 
intellectual property rights or the definition of “foreign direct 
investment.”36 Moreover, Article 207(5) repeats the exclusion of 
transport services, which shall continue to be subject to the transport 
part of the TFEU (Title VI of Part Three). 
As to trade in services in general, a case brought by the 
European Commission against the EU Council in 2012 and decided 
by the ECJ in the following year concerned the delimitation of acts 
having a specific link to international trade from acts relating to the 
EU internal market.37 It is notable that in this case the parties did not 
contest that the international trade in services falls under TFEU 
Article 207. The Council, contrary to the proposal of the Commission, 
had decided that the legal basis of the decision to sign a Council of 
                                                            
34. In this context, the Court also observed that under the WTO system, there may be 
“cross-suspension” of concessions between TRIPS and the other WTO multilateral 
agreements. Id. ¶ 54. 
35. Id. ¶ 55.  
36. See, e.g., EECKHOUT, supra note 13, at 63-64; Eeckhout, supra note 20, at 624-25; 
Rosas, supra note 7, at 21-22. 
37. See generally Case C-137/12, Comm’n. v. Council, 2013 EU:C:2013:675.  
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Europe Convention relating to the legal protection of radio, television 
and information society services based on conditional access (access 
subject to prior individual authorization) should be TFEU Article 114 
relating to the internal market and that the Convention should 
accordingly be signed both by the European Union and its Member 
States.38 Before the Court, the Council, together with some Member 
States, argued that the Convention was primarily intended to 
approximate the legislation of the contracting parties and that it thus 
concerned the EU internal market and that the fact that the 
Convention, unlike EU internal legislation in this field,39 also affected 
trade in services between the European Union and third countries, 
was of an indirect and secondary nature only. Some Member States 
added that the provisions of the Convention relating to seizure and 
confiscation were of a criminal-law nature and already for this reason 
fell outside the common commercial policy. 
The Court rejected this line of argument and annulled the 
Council decision. After a detailed analysis of the different provisions 
of the Convention, the Court concluded that it was supposed to help 
extend the application of EU internal legislation beyond the borders 
of the European Union in order to promote the supply of services to 
third countries, and that the aspects of the Convention which did not 
clearly relate to the international trade in services were of an 
incidental or ancillary nature. Hence the contested decision (to sign 
the Convention) “primarily” pursued an objective having a “specific 
connection to the common commercial policy.” That meant that the 
decision should have been based on TFEU Article 207(4) instead of 
Article 114 and that the signing of the Convention fell within the 
exclusive competence of the European Union.40 The judgment 
confirms earlier case law relating to “ancillary” provisions, implying 
that it is sufficient for an act to fall under the common commercial 
policy and thus EU exclusive competence if its primary objective and 
content is to regulate trade with third countries. 
                                                            
38. Unlike the common commercial policy, the internal market is in TFEU Article 4(2) 
listed among the areas of shared competence. See Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the 
OECD on National Treatment, 1995, EU:C:1995:83 (holding that the OECD rules in question 
were partly covered by the Unions internal market rules and not by the rules of its common 
commercial policy (¶ IV:25)). 
39. Council Directive 98/84, 1998 O.J. (L 320) 54 (EC) (discussing the legal protection 
of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access).  
40. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 37, ¶ 76. 
1084 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1073 
III. THE AETR/ERTA PRINCIPLE 
As noted above, the ECJ in its AETR/ERTA judgment of 1971 
held that each time the Community, with a view to implementing a 
common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying 
down common rules, “the Member States no longer have the right, 
acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with 
third countries which affect those rules.”41 This fairly broad formula 
was applied and clarified notably in Opinion 2/91, which, inter alia, 
made it clear that the AETR/ERTA principle would also apply to 
Community rules which did not “implement a common policy” in the 
meaning of the AETR/ERTA judgment itself.42 Moreover, according 
to the Opinion, it is not necessary that the area covered by EU 
legislation and the international agreement coincide fully as long as 
the relevant area is covered “to a large extent” by EU rules. Opinion 
2/91, on the other hand, provided for a more restrictive approach to 
Community rules which lay down minimum requirements only, 
stating that such rules may not be sufficiently “affected” by an 
international agreement which itself allows contracting parties to 
adopt more stringent measures than the minimum requirements of the 
agreement.43    
 In Opinion 1/94, in which the Court ruled that as Community 
law stood in 1994, GATS and TRIPS should be concluded jointly by 
the Community and its Member States, the Court also seems to have 
applied the AETR/ERTA principle in a somewhat more restrictive 
manner.44 True, the Court may even have slightly expanded this 
principle in stating that the Community acquires an exclusive 
competence not only when it has included in its internal legislation 
provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of third states, but 
also by the mere fact that internal legislation provides for a power to 
negotiate with third states. But when the Court added a third criteria, 
referring to a situation where there are no express provisions relating 
to third states in Community legislation—the situation which seems 
to be at the heart of the AETR/ERTA principle, it spoke of a situation 
of “complete harmonization” of the internal rules—as the common 
rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the 
                                                            
41. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 17, ¶ 17. 
42. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 EU:C:1993:106.  
43. Id., ¶¶ 17-21. 
44. Opinion 1/94, supra note 24; Cf. EECKHOUT, supra note 13, at 82-95 (arguing that 
“the Court left AETR and Opinion 1/76 fully intact”). 
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AETR/ERTA judgment.45 Whilst this dictum was made in a GATS 
context, with the Court referring to the complete harmonization of 
rules “governing access to a self-employed activity,” it has often been 
understood as a ruling of more general relevance. 
That was at least the interpretation of Opinion 1/94 on this point 
put forward in the so-called “Open Skies” judgments of 2002, which 
concerned the conformity with EU law of bilateral air transport 
agreements concluded by some Member States with the United 
States.46 These judgments did establish an exclusive AETR/ERTA 
competence but this competence only covered certain concrete issues 
(such as air fares) and did not establish an exclusive competence for 
air transport agreements in general.   
In Opinion 1/03, the Court was called upon to rule on the 
relevance of the AETR/ERTA principle for the conclusion of a 
multilateral agreement relating to private international law.47 The 
Court this time concluded that the new agreement fell “entirely within 
the sphere of exclusive competence of the European Community.”48 
The following elements should be highlighted: (1) the Court took a 
certain distance to the above-mentioned three situations leading to an 
exclusive competence set out in Opinion 1/94—and repeated in the 
Open Skies judgments of 200249—and now stated that these were 
only examples, formulated in the particular contexts with which the 
Court was concerned; (2) the Court confirmed a dictum in Opinion 
2/91 according to which it is not necessary for the areas covered by 
the international agreement and the EU legislation to coincide fully 
and that an area which is “already covered to a large extent” by EU 
rules may suffice;50 (3) in the latter context, the Court also confirmed 
and specified a reference in Opinion 2/91 by observing that it is 
necessary to take into account “not only the current state of 
Community law in the area in question but also its future 
development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that 
                                                            
45. Id. ¶ 96.  
46. See, e.g., Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Den., 2002 EU:C:2002:625, ¶ 84. Compare id., 
with ¶ 82, where another formula is used and the other so-called Open Skies judgments 
delivered on the same day.  
47. The Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, provides for an extension of most of the rules of an 
internal EU regulation to some non-member states. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 304) 34.  
48. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, 2006 EU:C:2006:81. 
49. See Comm’n v. Den., supra note 46, ¶ 45. 
50. Opinion 1/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1198, ¶ 126.  
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analysis;”51 (4) the Court further confirmed that initiatives seeking to 
avoid contradictions on substance between EU law and the agreement 
does not remove the obligation to determine, prior to the conclusion 
of the agreement, whether it is capable of affecting the EU rules 
within the meaning of the AETR/ERTA principle;52 and (5) on the 
other hand, the Court emphasized that an exclusive competence may 
not follow from mere suppositions but requires a “specific analysis,” 
which must be both “comprehensive and detailed,”53 of the 
relationship between the agreement and the EU rules concerned. 
What mattered, at the end of the day, was to ensure that the 
agreement was “not capable of undermining the uniform and 
consistent application of the Community rules and the proper 
functioning of the system which they establish.” Opinion 1/03 can be 
said to have implied a certain return to the general approach of the 
initial AETR/ERTA judgment viewed in combination with certain 
dicta, notably the “to a large extent” criterion, of Opinion 2/91. The 
new provision in TFEU Article 3(2) is also based on a fairly broad 
understanding of this principle. Reference is made here to not only 
situations where the conclusion of an agreement “is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union”—one of the three situations mentioned in 
Opinion 1/94—or the so-called 1/76 criterion—which will not be 
further explored in this context54—but also situations where the 
conclusion of the agreement “may affect common rules or alter their 
scope.” The need for “complete harmonization” of the area by EU 
legislation is not mentioned. 
In an infringement case brought in 2007, that is, before the entry 
into force of the TFEU, the Commission argued that a Member State, 
by submitting to the International Maritime Organization a proposal 
for the monitoring of ships and port facilities, acted in contravention 
of the European Union’s exclusive competence, following from a 
regulation on enhancing ship and port facility security.55 The Court 
agreed, and the Member State was condemned for having failed to 
fulfil its obligations under EU law.56 By reference to the 
AETR/ERTA judgment, the Court observed that the Member State 
                                                            
51. Id. ¶ 126. 
52. Id. ¶ 129.  
53. Id. ¶¶ 124, 133. 
54. See supra, notes 19-20 and accompanying text.  
55. Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004, 2004 O.J. L 129/6.  
56. Case C-45/07, Comm’n v. Greece, [2009] E.C.R. I-701.  
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had set in motion a procedure which could have led—although it had 
not actually led—to the adoption of new international rules in a field 
covered by the Regulation in question and had thus taken an initiative 
“likely to affect the provisions of the Regulation.”57  
That the dicta of Opinions 2/91 and 1/03 continue to be relevant 
in a post-Lisbon context also has been confirmed in recent case law. 
In a case brought by the European Commission against the Council, 
the Commission asked for the annulment of a decision taken by the 
Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States, by which the Commission was denied authorization to 
negotiate the entire future Council of Europe Convention on the 
protection of neighbouring rights of broadcasting organisations, the 
decision being based on the assumption that the agreement envisaged 
belonged to the sphere of shared competence.58 The Court agreed with 
the Commission and concluded, in annulling the contested decision, 
that the negotiations to be held “f[e]ll within the exclusive 
competence of the Union.”  
This conclusion was grounded in a reaffirmation of the “covered 
to a large extent” formula following from Opinions 2/91 and 1/03 and 
was reached after a “specific analysis” of the relationship between the 
agreement envisaged and the EU legislation in question, as required 
by Opinion 1/03. The judgment thus confirms the relevance of the 
earlier case law for an application and interpretation of the 
AETR/ERTA criterion of Article TFEU 3(2). In referring to a 
possible “risk that common EU rules might be adversely affected by 
international commitments, or that the scope of those rules might be 
altered,”59 the judgment seems to be based on a fairly broad 
interpretation of the AETR/ERTA principle. The Court in any case 
firmly rejected the view put forward by some Member States arguing 
that since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the exclusive 
external competence of the European Union should be viewed in a 
more restrictive way.60 
In this case, the Court also clarified an issue which in most other 
decisions of the Court relating to the AETR/ERTA principle have 
been tackled only implicitly: What is the “area” of legal regulation to 
be considered when it has to be decided whether EU legislation 
                                                            
57. Id. ¶ 23. 
58. Comm’n v. Council, Case C-114/12, EU:C:2014:2151. 
59. Id. ¶ 68. 
60. Id. ¶¶ 82-73. 
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covers something “to a large extent” and according to which criteria 
should this “area” be determined? This question became of particular 
significance in the case in question as the Advocate General of the 
Court had split the international agreement relating to the rights of 
broadcasting organisations into different “parts,” holding that in order 
to establish an exclusive competence for the entire international 
agreement to be negotiated, it is necessary that “each and every part” 
of that agreement be covered by EU rules.61 On this basis, and on the 
basis of quite a detailed analysis of some specific questions—such as 
the right of retransmission, as distinct from the notions of fixation, 
reproduction, distribution and making available to the public, and the 
right of protection of pre-broadcast programme-carrying signals—she 
concluded that the Commission had not been able to establish that 
“each and every part” of the agreement belonged to the sphere of 
exclusive competence—partly because some EU rules seemed to 
establish minimum requirements only. The European Union thus did 
not have an exclusive competence to negotiate the entire agreement, 
despite the fact that, according to the Advocate General, it was 
“undoubtedly true that EU law covers a considerable part of what 
falls to be negotiated.”62 
The Court did not subscribe to such a piecemeal approach. By 
reference to applicable EU legislation, it observed that the 
neighbouring rights of broadcasting organisations are the subject of a 
“harmonized legal framework” which has established a regime with 
high, homogenous protection for broadcasting organisations. As the 
negotiations to be conducted aimed at an international treaty relating 
to the same subject-matter—the protection of neighbouring rights of 
broadcasting organisations—that was the relevant area for the 
purposes of the AETR-ERTA-based analysis, and as that area was 
covered “to a large extent” by EU rules, the competence became 
exclusive for the entire agreement. It was in this regard immaterial 
whether the harmonized legal framework in question had been 
established by various legal instruments—as was the case here63—or 
not.  
The Court also referred to a previous judgment relating to the 
environment, where “the protection of waters against pollution,” 
                                                            
61. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of Apr. 3, 2014, Comm’n v. Council, supra 
note 58, ¶¶ 111, 143-45, 166.  
62. Id. ¶ 145.  
63. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 58, ¶¶ 78-84.  
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which was the subject-matter of the international agreement in 
question, was considered as the “area” which had to be taken into 
account.64 In other contexts as well the Court has considered a legal 
regime or framework as a whole rather than determining the nature of 
the European Union’s competence separately for each and every 
concrete question;65 on the other hand, the Court has not always 
limited its analysis to an entire agreement to be negotiated or 
concluded, but has in some cases provided different answers to 
different parts of an agreement in so far as these parts have been 
clearly distinguishable from each other.66 
The Court’s approach seems nevertheless to be based on the 
consideration that an international agreement normally forms a whole, 
where everything may have an impact on everything, and that 
splitting this whole up into small parts would be foreign to the reality 
of international treaty negotiations. This could also have as an effect 
that there were practically no treaty negotiations which would any 
longer be entirely covered by an exclusive competence—as there 
would almost always be some question which has not yet been fully 
covered by existing EU legislation; such an approach would also 
render the “to a large extent” criterion close to meaningless.   
Finally, the judgment clarifies the scope of the exception for 
“minimum requirements” which had been formulated in Opinion 
2/91—and reiterated in some later decisions. With regard to the right 
of “retransmission,” some Member States had argued that as the 
internal EU rules referred only to retransmission by wireless means, 
these rules constituted a minimum harmonization only, and thus the 
international agreement could freely extend the concept of 
retransmission to retransmission by wire, including the internet. The 
                                                            
64. Id. ¶ 83. The reference was to Commission v. France, Case C-239/03, 
EU:C:2004:598 (although in this case, the Court was only called upon to decide whether a 
given question fell under a Union competence and not whether that competence was exclusive 
or shared).  
65. See, e.g., Opinion 1/03, supra note 48, where the Court first distinguished between 
the jurisdiction of (national) courts and the recognition and enforcement of their judgments 
under Regulation 44/2001 but then observed that these two issues “are closely linked” (at ¶ 
163) and that the relevant Community rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
“are indissociable from those on the jurisdiction of courts, with which them form a unified and 
coherent system” (at ¶ 172). 
66. For instance, in Opinion 1/94, supra note 24, ¶¶ 43-53, the Court with regard to 
GATS made a distinction between the cross-frontier supply of services not involving any 
movement of persons and other services as well as between transport services and other 
services. See Opinion 2/91, supra note 42.  
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Court disagreed, pointing out that the scope of the right of 
retransmission under the EU rules did not concern a situation 
comparable to that stated in Opinion 2/91, in which both the EU rules 
and the international agreement had laid down minimum 
requirements.67 The material scope of the right of retransmission as 
circumscribed in the EU Directive in question would have been 
altered if the international agreement came to extend that right to 
retransmission by wire.68 The definition of a basic concept is in other 
words not a minimum requirement but a limitation of the scope of the 
concept which will inevitably be altered if the international agreement 
foresees another definition—it should be recalled in this context that 
the international agreement, too, would become an integral part of EU 
law and it would even prevail over internal secondary law.69 
Soon—roughly one month—after this judgment the ECJ gave an 
opinion on the extent of the respective powers of the European Union 
and its Member States to declare the acceptance of the accession of 
third states to the 1980 Hague Convention on the civil aspects of 
international child abduction.70 This Convention provides for an 
exceptional procedure whereby an accession to it will have effect only 
as regards the bilateral relations between the acceding state and a 
contracting party which has declared its acceptance thereof. Whilst 
the European Union cannot become a contracting party—as the 
Convention is open to “states” only—the Commission had proposed 
Council decisions authorizing Member States to give declarations of 
acceptance, “in the interest of the EU,” of the accession of eight third 
states to the Convention. The Commission argued that such a Council 
authorization71 was necessary in view of the fact that the international 
abduction of children had become part of an exclusive competence of 
the European Union, given Regulation No. 2201/2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility.72 
                                                            
67. See Opinion 2/91, supra note 42, ¶ 18.  
68. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 58, ¶¶ 90-92. 
69. See, e.g., ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 1, 59-61. 
70. Opinion 1/13, Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
EU:C:2014:2303. 
71. On the mechanism of Council authorization, “in the interest of the EU,” of Member 
State action in the field of EU exclusive competence, see ROSAS, supra note 6, at 1331-35; 
Rosas, supra note 7, at 32-33. 
72. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of Nov. 27, 2003, 2003 O.J. L 338/1.  
2015] EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS 1091 
Opinion 1/13 first of all confirmed earlier case law, including in 
particular the “cover to a large extent” criterion, which in conjunction 
with the judgment relating to the Council of Europe convention on 
rights of broadcasting organizations was said to persist also with 
TFEU Article 3(2).73 Then, after having established that the 
provisions of the Regulation “cover to a large extent” the two 
procedures governed by the 1980 Hague Convention, namely the 
procedure concerning the return of wrongfully abducted children and 
the procedure for securing the exercise of access rights, the Court 
went on to consider whether there was a “risk” that common EU rules 
may be affected. In this regard, Regulation 2201/2003 contained less 
elements of an obvious relevance for relations with third countries 
than Regulation 44/2001 relating to jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which 
was dealt with in Opinion 1/03.74 The Court nevertheless observed 
that there was an overlap and close connection between the provisions 
of Regulation 2201/2003 and those of the Convention and that the 
provisions of the latter “may have an effect on the meaning, scope 
and effectiveness” of the rules laid down in the former. The Court 
moreover referred to the specific situation which could arise when 
one Member State acting individually would accept the accession to 
the Convention of a third state whilst another Member State would 
not. In a concrete situation involving at the same time a third state and 
these two Member States, there would be a “risk of undermining the 
uniform and consistent application of Regulation No 2201/2003 and, 
in particular, the rules concerning cooperation between the authorities 
of the Member States.”75 
One is left with the impression that particularly with this 
decision, the threshold for concluding an AETR/ERTA effect is not 
very high. It is noteworthy that the Court in several instances refers to 
a “risk” of affectation. That, in itself, is fully in line with the wording 
of TFEU Article 3(2), which provides for an exclusive competence in 
so far as the conclusion of an international agreement “may affect” 
common rules or alter their scope. It is arguable, on the other hand, 
that some of the older decisions, and perhaps Opinion 1/94 in 
particular, were based on a somewhat more restrictive view of the 
scope of the AETR/ERTA principle.  
                                                            
73. Opinion 1/13, supra note 70, ¶ 73. 
74. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
75. Opinion 1/13, supra note 70, ¶ 89. 
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The story does not end here, however. About one month after 
having given its Opinion 1/13, the Court gave a preliminary ruling76 
on some questions put to it by an Italian court.77 The national judge 
wanted to know whether, having regard to an EU directive on the 
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in 
the internal electricity market,78 the European Union had exclusive 
external competence that precluded a provision of Italian law, which 
provided for an exemption to acquire green certificates in case of 
electricity imports from a third state on the basis of a bilateral 
agreement between Italy and the third state (Switzerland), under 
which the electricity imported was guaranteed to be green. As under 
the national legislation that exemption was conditional on the 
conclusion, between Italy and the third state, of an international 
agreement on mutual recognition of electricity as being produced 
from renewable sources, it became important to know whether such a 
system was compatible with EU external competences in this field. 
The Court, by observing that the question concerned the 
applicability of the AETR/ERTA principle, confirmed that this 
principle is relevant also in the context of the protection of the 
environment, despite the fact that TFEU Article 4 (2) lists the 
“environment” among the shared competences and that the Directive 
in question has been adopted on the basis of the then Article 175 of 
the EC Treaty (now TFEU Article 192).79 This is in line with a 
Declaration adopted already in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht 
of 1992, according to which the references in the EC Treaty to a 
shared competence, inter alia, in the field of the environment (then 
Article 130) “do not affect the principles resulting from the judgment 
handed down by the Court of Justice in the AETR case.”80 
The Court held that the European Union had acquired an 
exclusive competence to conclude agreements of the nature envisaged 
under the Italian legislation to be concluded by Italy. This conclusion 
was basically grounded in three different considerations. First of all, 
                                                            
76. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, The National Judge as EU Judge: Some Constitutional 
Observations, 67 SMU L. REV. 717 (2014) (on the preliminary ruling procedure based on 
TFEU Article 267). 
77. Green Network, Case C-66/13, EU:C:2014. 
78. Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Sept. 27, 
2001, (2001) O.J. L 283, 33. 
79. Green Network, supra note 77, ¶¶ 35-36.  
80. Declaration on Article 109, 130r and 130y of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1.   
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the purpose of a certain provision of the EU Directive was to 
harmonize the conditions on, and mechanisms under, which 
electricity could and must be certified in the EU as being green 
electricity. As the effect of the envisaged bilateral agreement could 
have been to extend the scope of this harmonized mechanism, by 
allowing guarantees of origin issued in third states to enjoy a status 
equivalent to that enjoyed by guarantees of origin issued in the 
Member States, such an agreement was liable to “alter the scope” of 
the common rules laid down in the Directive.81 Second, a bilateral 
agreement, by making it possible, in the operation of a national 
support scheme, to take into account also the green nature of 
electricity produced in a third state, could interfere with the objectives 
of the Directive and the obligation of the EU Member States to 
increase their national production of green electricity. The conclusion 
of such agreements was therefore “liable to affect the proper 
functioning of the system established by [the D]irective.”82 Thirdly, 
the judgment recalls that according to the case law,83 in assessing 
whether an area is already “largely covered” by EU rules, account 
should be taken not only of EU law as it stands but also “its future 
development, in so far as that is foreseeable at the time of [the] 
analysis.”84 In this regard, the Court observed that whilst the Directive 
in question did not lay down a Community-wide support scheme for 
electricity produced from renewable sources, the Commission was 
requested to present a report accompanied, if necessary, by a proposal 
for a Community framework for the national support schemes, and 
that the Italian legislation was adopted during the period in which the 
Commission was required to examine this question. The Court also 
mentioned that a new Directive of 2009,85 which had replaced the 
previous Directive of 2001, referred to the need to specify the 
conditions under which green electricity produced in a third state 
could be taken into account by a Member States in order to achieve 
the binding target on green energy imposed on it by the new 
                                                            
81. Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Nov. 26, 2014), ¶¶ 41-49. 
82. Id. ¶¶ 50-60. 
83. Id. ¶¶ 33, 61; See Opinion 2/91, supra note 42, ¶ 25; Opinion 1/03, supra note 48, ¶ 
126; Comm’n v. Council, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Sept. 4, 2014), ¶ 74; Opinion 1/13, 
supra note 70, ¶ 74. 
84. Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Nov. 26, 2014), ¶ 61.  
85. Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 23, 
2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and 
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. L 140/16. 
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Directive.86 This seems to be the first time that the Court makes 
concrete use of the criterion of “future development” as one element 
pointing at the existence of exclusive competence in a given area.87 
CONCLUSION 
By its AETR/ERTA judgment of 1971 and Opinion 1/75, the 
ECJ provided an important platform for the existence not only of a 
competence to conclude international agreements in the name of the 
European Union, but also of an exclusive competence in this regard. 
Subsequent case law relating to the common commercial policy 
introduced some important limits to this concept. According to 
Opinion 1/94 the trade in services and the trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights fell largely outside an exclusive 
competence;88 and according to some later Court decisions, even 
measures affecting the trade in goods could fall outside the common 
commercial policy if the measures were deemed to pursue 
predominantly objectives other than the promotion of trade as such, 
such as the protection of the environment.89 
The AETR/ERTA principle, too, became circumscribed by dicta 
making a reserve for EU legislation providing for minimum 
requirements only (Opinion 2/91) and referring to the need for 
“complete harmonization” as one ground for an exclusive 
AETR/ERTA competence (Opinion 1/94). Opinion 2/91, it is true, 
also introduced the “to a large extent” criterion and made reference to 
the future development of EU law as a possible element to be taken 
into account, but with the exception of the Open Skies judgments,90 in 
which a limited external competence was confirmed, there were no 
cases in which the ECJ determined the existence of an AETR/ERTA 
exclusive competence.91  
The scope of the common commercial policy was considerably 
enlarged by the Treaty of Lisbon and the new definition given in 
TFEU Article 207. The judgment in Daiichi Sankyo of 2013 confirms 
                                                            
86. Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Nov. 26, 2014), ¶¶ 63-64.  
87. Id. 
88. Opinion 1/94, supra note 24. 
89. See Opinion 2/00, supra note 27; see also Comm’n v. Council, [2006] E.C.R. I-1; 
Comm’n v. Parliament and Council, [2006] E.C.R. I-7585. 
90. See Comm’n v. Denmark, [2002] E.C.R. I-9519, ¶ 84.  
91. In Opinion 2/92, supra note 38, ¶¶ 25, 31-34, an AETR/ERTA competence was 
denied.  
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that the whole area of TRIPS falls under Article 207,92 and there is 
every reason to believe that the same conclusion would apply to the 
trade in services and GATS.93 There are, on the other hand, some 
issues which remain to be clarified in later case law, such as the exact 
scope of the notions of “commercial aspects” of intellectual property 
outside the TRIPS framework and of “foreign direct investment,” 
both appearing in TFEU Article 207. 
With Opinion 1/03,94 as well as the new rule in TFEU Article 
3(2), the AETR/ERTA principle has experienced somewhat of a 
renaissance. Not only in Opinion 1/03, but also in an infringement 
case of 2009 and in three judgments given in 2014, the ECJ has 
confirmed the existence of an AETR/ERTA-based exclusive 
competence.95 It is too early to predict all the consequences Article 
3(2) and this new case law may have for the application of the 
AETR/ERTA principle in general. What seems undeniable, however, 
is that in the light of this case law, the principle will play an important 
role in judging the nature of EU external competences. What is 
noticeable, in particular, is the Court’s focus, in determining whether 
there is coverage “to a large extent,” on a given legal regime rather 
than each and every detail of this regime, the limitation of the reserve 
for “minimum requirements” to situations where it is clear that both 
the EU internal rules and the international agreements provide for 
such requirements only, and the inclusion of future foreseeable legal 
developments in the elements to be taken into account when deciding 
whether EU rules may be affected or not. The general but at the same 
time ultimate criterion formulated in Opinion 1/03 and in subsequent 
case law, namely the need to ensure that the agreement is “not 
capable of undermining the uniform and consistent application of the 
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which they 
establish,” calls for an overall assessment, adjusted to the 
particularities of each case, rather than a strict fixation on this or that 
more detailed criterion. 
With the by now extensive, and it seems, ever expanding, EU 
legislation in areas such as the environment, transport, judicial 
                                                            
92. See Daiichi Sankyo, [2013] E.C.R I___ (delivered July 18, 2013), ¶¶ 52, 54-55.   
93. See also Comm’n v. Council, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Oct. 22, 2013). 
94. Supra note 48, and accompanying text. 
95. Comm’n v. Greece, [2009] E.C.R. I-701; Comm’n v. Council, [2014] E.C.R. I___ 
(delivered Sept. 4, 2014); Opinion 1/13, supra note 70; Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ 
(delivered Nov. 26, 2014). 
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cooperation in civil matters, and the status of third-country nationals 
and asylum-seekers, there is a potential for a broad rather than narrow 
application of the AETR/ERTA principle, including with respect to 
bilateral agreements between the European Union and third 
countries.96 The last chapter on the scope of exclusive external 
competence is far from having been written. 
 
 
                                                            
96. Important bilateral agreements such as association agreements have also recently 
been concluded as mixed agreements. See Rosas, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
